INTRODUCTION
Disagreement about the nature of constitutional rights in our legal system is prevalent. For those who view the Constitution as a set of principles for protecting individual rights, physician-assisted suicide raises the question of whether our rights may be transferable. Or, must we exempt physicians from the criminal prohibitions against aiding suicide in order to realize our sense of autonomy in dying? In other words, ·can a patient's personal "right of privacy" protect a physician from criminal prosecution for assisting the patient's suicide?
In Washington v. Glucksberg 2 and Vacco v. Quill, 3 the Supreme Court answered this question in its constitutional form with a "no" by affirming that criminal prosecutions of physicians for assisting patients' deaths remain theoretically possible. In Quill, the Court rejected an "equal protection" challenge to New York's assisting or aiding suicide laws. 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, reasoned that it is "rational" for legislatures to provide immunity from prosecution for those physicians who remove life-sustaining technologies of terminally ill patients in accordance with state law, while at the same time subjecting physicians to criminal liability if they accede to patient requests for lethal doses of barbiturates. 5 In Glucksberg, the unanimous Court used five different reasons to find no "liberty" violation in Washington's statutory provisions against causing or aiding suicide. 6 In so doing, the Court in-and administrative bodies.l 1 Such an approach assumes that legislatures and courts should examine the question of physicians' rights in the same manner-that courts and legislatures are essentially the same kind of institution-at least when it comes to addressing major social values such as how we die. This approach encourages legislators and voters to examine the Court's rhetoric about the nature of "rights" in framing and resolving legislative issues.
Legislatures, however, differ from courts. Both are legal institutions, but they have different procedures and constraints. More significantly, legislators and their staffs are obligated to listen to all of the contentious views, even those that differ from their own views and principles about how law should structure our relationships with our physicians. Courts, on the other hand, are obligated to decide only those cases that litigants bring before them. As a result of these contrasts, in constitutional adjudication, courts must determine which institution should resolve an issue.
I reject Glucksberg as a guide for building the analysis for the ensuing legislative debate. Rather, Quill provides the institutional framework for delineating the issues we face in legislative forums and other institutional settings.
The institutional analysis embedded in Quill is easy to miss for one simple reason: the Second Circuit decided its case a few months before the Supreme Court issued a major opinion on equal protection, Romer v. Evans. 12 In Evans, the Court held that a Colorado constitution~ amendment violated the United States Constitution. 13 The amendment disabled local municipalities from enacting any legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 14 The Court struck down the amendment without finding any "fundamental right" or declaring that homosexuals are members of a "suspect class." 15 (1986) , which upheld the constitutionality of state statutes maldng sodomy a crime. Kennedy avoided Bowers by framing the question in terms of whether the Colorado amendment was rationally related to a "legitimate governmental purpose." Evans, 116 S. Ct at 1629. Such a statement of the issue allowed the majority of the Court to define the outer boundaries of the legislative process. By invalidating the Colorado amendment, the majority's equal protection "constitutional right to die" by viewing the matter as one of institutional choice, Quill becomes the starting point for interpreting the scope of legislative authority to exempt physicians from legal liability for assisting their patients' deaths. 1 6 A particular Justice's views on abortion, choice in dying, or family formation are informed by how that Justice makes the choice between courts, legislative processes, or "the market" as the appropriate forum for public policy making. Each of the five Justices writing opinions 17 in Glucksberg and Quill posed different questions about institutional processes. All of the Justices concluded, however, that the legislature is the legal forum for defining which patient actions are self-killing or suicide. In denying the physicians' claim for a constitutional right, the Court also granted to political processes the job of determining which physician acts constitute legally impermissible assistance in patient deaths.
Part I illustrates that the problem of physician-assisted suicide requires an analysis of two basic social institutions: law and medicine. The different institutional perspectives of the Justices led to variation in their Quill opinions. We discover these different theories of comparative institutional analysis by letting the questions each Justice asks frame the analysis. All of these different theories are subsumed by the overall question in law and medicine inherent in Quill: when is terminating medical care suicide? Part II demonstrates that interpretations of federal drug laws and Medicare and Medicaid regulations have a role to play in the physician-assisted suicide debate. Finally, Part III suggests that the phyanalysis provided constitutional protection from "irrational legislation" by providing all individuals with a core right to participate in interest group politics.
In contrast, Justice Scalia's dissent used Bowers to frame the constitutional issue when he stated the overall issue to be whether a majority can preserve "traditional mores" against a politically powerful minority. See id. at 1631-32, 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's equal protection analysis requires that the plaintiffs be entitled to some "fundamental right" before the Court can invalidate legislation.
The implications of Evans for the debate on physician-assisted suicide are apparent if one uses the approach of either the Evans majority or dissent to frame the issue. If one asks whether there is a fundamental right in the physician-assisted suicide cases to commit suicide, the Evans dissenters would answer with a resounding "no." If, using the Evans majority's analysis, one asks if physicians or patients in the assisted suicide cases are denied their right to "rational legislation," the answer is also likely to be "no," for a number of complex reasons discussed later in this article. The basic point is that the first step in any institutional analysis of problems in law and medicine is the kind of questions one asks. 16 After Oregon enacted its Death with Dignity Act permitting a form of physician-assisted death, some individuals challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that it violated the requirement of "equal protection. 
I. IS TERMINATING MEDICAL CARE SUICIDE?
The Supreme Court's unanimous vote rejecting the constitutional claims in Vacco v. Quill illustrates how the judges of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals misconstrued the constitutional issues. The premise underlying the Second Circuit's finding of an equal protection violation in the New York statutory scheme was based on an assumption about the . allocation of institutional responsibility. Judge Miner, for the Second Circuit majority, interpreted prior Supreme Court cases as implying that federal constitutional courts rather than the New York legislature, had the institutional power to declare that the removal of medical care was the equivalent of suicide. 18 The Supreme Court not only rejected that premise, but used the brief from the American Medical Association and other professional organizations to reject the proposed institutional balance between courts, medicine, and legislatures articulated in Judge Calabresi's Second Circuit concurring opinion.I9
A. Is THE DEFINITION ·oF SUICIDE A PoLmCAL DECISION?
In finding the New York statutory scheme "rational" under equal protection analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied upon Evans as stating the appropriate standard for examining the physicians' claims. 20 When Rehnquist asserted in Quill that the Equal Protection Clause "creates no substantive rights," 21 he meant more than simply that the various legislative provisions in question are presumed constitutional. He meant the physician-litigants have to demonstrate that the legislation puts physicians, not patients, in an institutionally untenable position.
To reject the argument that physicians could rely upon the rights of their patients, Justice Rehnquist had to reject Quill's rhetorically powerful brief and its premises about modern medicine. 22 Professor Tribe, Quill's lawyer, had constructed his brief around the suffering and plight of by-then-dead patients. Tribe relied upon the declarations of patients who were dying of cancer and complications associated with AJDS2 3 to support his assertion that a patient "in the final stages of dying is not committing suicide when choosing to avoid only unbearable, consciousness-filling pain or suffering." 24 Only these patients, Tribe asserted, have a constitutional right. 25 In essence, Professor Tribe invited the Court to construct the cases around hypothetical patients instead of his client, Dr. Quill, and his colleagues.
In denying Dr. Quill's claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion relied heavily upon the brief filed by the American Medical Association and forty-five other professional organizations. 26 According to the AMA, physicians generally distinguish between terminating life-sustaining treatment and intending to cause a patient's death. 27 Thus, legislation which prohibits physicians from assisting patients' deaths properly classifies situations in which physicians "intend" their patients' deaths. Legislation granting physicians immunity from criminal prosecution when they remove life support properly categorizes such deaths as "unintentional." Furthermore, removal of life support demonstrates the institutionalization of the ethical principle of "respect for patient autonomy" in modern medicine. More significantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied upon language in the AMA Brief to assert that "the law has long used intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts with the same result." 28 The fundamental point of the AMA Brief was that the distinction made in New York law would help ensure that the medical field would begin to address its inadequacies regarding pain relief. Finally, the AMA Brief helped Chief Justice Rehnquist dismiss Professor Tribe's suggestion that the Court could determine that "terminal sedation"-the practice of providing pain medication for some terminal patients until they are unconscious-made the prohibition of a lethal dosage upon request constitutionally irrational. 29 The AMA's description of pain management in modern medicine allowed Chief Justice Rehnquist to put this practice into a conceptual framework of consent by the patient, the intent of the physician, and the ethical principle of "double effect." 30 Holding that legislative distinctions were rational in general, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged differences of opinion in the medical community regarding physician-assisted death 31 and the possibility of some situations where there might be a constitutional defect in a legislative scheme. 32 For Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, defining "suicide" is a political decision and not a task for constitutional adjudication.
Once it had been established in Glucksberg that the then-dead plaintiffs had no constitutional right to physician-assisted death, the primary question for Chief Justice Rehnquist in Vacco v. Quill was whether the New York legislature had somehow infringed upon the constitutional rights of physicians. For Rehnquist, holding criminal prohibitions against assisted suicide-even when applicable to physicians-to be a constitutional exercise of state legislative authority, effectuates the appropriate institutional balance between legislatures, courts, and the medical community. Underlying Chief Justice Rehnquist's construction of the issues in Quill, therefore, is an institutional choice of legislatures, rather than courts, to define suicide.
B. WHEN ARE JUDGES AND JURIES ALLOWED TO lNv ALIDATE PHYSICIANS' CONVICTIONS FOR ASSISTED SUICIDE?
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion, in which he discussed the constitutional issues in both Quill and Glucksberg, presented a different view of the appropriate institutional balance between the medical community, legislatures, and courts. Stevens relied upon the briefs of Professor Tribe and others, urging the Court to find a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide in framing the issues with regard to medicine. 33 Justice Souter's short concurring opinion in Quill adopted Justice Stevens's view that the state "permits" what he calls "death-hastening pain medication." 43 In his attempt to synthesize the Court's complex due process and equal protection cases through a "principled" methodology for determining the constitutionality of statutes, 44 Justice Souter assumed that the question was whether courts or legislatures should "permit" terminal sedation. He argued that it is appropriate for legislatures to "perInit" the practice, 45 but failed to consider the empirical reality that the practice was, in fact, authorized by the medical community, and not the courts or legislatures.
Souter's common law method of adjudication 46 assumed that "terIninal coma" is what Professor Tribe described, as opposed to the end result of a carefully thought through process of medical intervention. As the patient is gradually given increased doses of pain medication, the patient's tolerance for the medication grows. In other words, an ethical physician does not commence pain medication with the intent of creating a "terminal coma." Rather, physicians determine the amount of sedation a terminally ill patient should receive after careful consideration of the particular patient's condition and consultation with the patient and his or her fainily. 47 The significance of Justice Souter's framing of the question is that legislatures can make distinctions between various proposed medical practices without violating the Constitution. Yet, implicit in Souter's Glucksberg opinion is the proposition that the Court holds the ultimate authority to determine if a certain legislative distinction is an arbitrary infringement on liberty. Thus, this somewhat complex methodology invites continued constitutional adjudication.
D. DoES MEDICINE CAUSE DEATHS WITHOUT DIGNITY?
Justice Breyer was more explicit about the nature of the constitutional adjudication that Inight follow Glucksberg and Quill. He explic-43 117 S. Ct at 2302 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). (1973) . 47 When students in my spring, 1997 seminar on physician-assisted suicide questioned a colleague from our medical college about terminal coma, many of them assumed the question was: "Doctor, how much pain medication does it take to kill a patient?" The physician pointed out that the amount of pain medication a patient can withstand depends upon the previous amount of pain medication she had been receiving.
[Vol. 7:415 itly asserted that there may be some type of constitutional "right to die with dignity." 48 Breyer relied upon the briefs of the AMA, the National Hospice Care Organization, and Choice in Dying to frame the issue as one of medicine's failures:
Medical technology, we are repeatedly told, makes the administration of pain-relieving drugs sufficient, except for a very few individuals for whom the ineffectiveness of pain control medicines can mean, not pain, but the need for sedation which can end in a coma. 49 According to Justice Breyer, neither state statutes nor judicial rulings prevented patients from obtaining pain relief. 50 As he stated in his opinion, many terminally ill patients do not receive adequate pain medication "for institutional reasons or inadequacies or obstacles, which would seem possible to overcome, and which do not include a prohibitive set of laws." 51 In his opinion, Justice Breyer attempted to put a "gloss" on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion which explicitly joined with Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion. 52 The portion of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion dealing with Quill makes an important assertion: "There is no dispute that dying patients in ... New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so 48 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 49 319 (1996) . But none of the litigants in the cases before the Court made out a plausible claim of a realistic fear of prosecution or professional discipline for administering pain medication. The Court did, however, take up the issue of pain relief. See infra text accompanying notes 55-56. 51 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original would hasten their deaths." 55 She made it clear that the case does not raise the question of whether those terminally ill patients who are "suffering" can obtain pain relief. O'Connor struck a different institutional balance from Chief Justice Rehnquist. By framing the question in terms of relieving patient suffering, Justice O'Connor narrowed the scope of any future constitutional claims. She shut the door on a claim about suicide, but clearly wanted to provide litigants with greater access to courts on issues of suffering during their terminal illnesses than Chief Justice Rehnquist; s analysis would permit.
Justice O'Connor's desire to permit future constitutional adjudication on issues of pain relief indicates that she has less confidence than does Justice Rehnquist in the ability of legislatures to control medicine. Review of O'Connor's earlier opinions supports this conclusion. First, her short concurring opinion in Cruzan made clear that she wanted to leave open the question of whether the legislature could prohibit a surrogate from removing medical treatment on behalf of a comatose patient. 56 Although no state had an explicit prohibition against surrogate removal, O'Connor seemed aware of the potential for other institutional forces, such as religion or medicine, to influence legislation regarding the removal of life support. 57 More important, Justice O'Connor indicated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 58 the most recent abortion case, that she wants the Court to be able to adapt to changing societal concepts of liberty without granting broad definitions of constitutional rights. 59 Lest anyone assume that she was inviting constitutional litigation, O'Connor asserted-rightly in my opinion-that there are no legal barriers to the administration of pain relief medication. 60 Or, put more pragmatically, when O'Connor committed the issue of physician-assisted death to the "laboratories" of the states, 61 she provided a context for both legislatures and potential litigants. For the latter, she made it clear that "facial," as opposed to "as applied," attacks on regulatory schemes regarding the dispensing of drugs would receive a cool reception. 62 Moreover, it is apparent that the plaintiff's identity would make a great deal of difference in the outcome of any future constitutional adjudication. Thus, a physician subject to professional discipline for administering pain medication to a terminally ill patient might be able to raise the liberty claim of her patient to obtain adequate pain relief.
II. THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUBSEQUENT DEBATES
All nine justices agreed with Justice O'Connor's rhetoric about the constitutional right to palliative care. 63 As a practical matter, this implies that any legislation prohibiting assisted suicide should have a specific provision exempting physicians who are administering palliative care. 64 Consequently, the state legislative debate begins by eliminating the policy option of tightening up regulations of pain medication.
None of the major players opposed to physician-assisted suicide in the constitutional and political forums, such as the AMA and the Catholic Church, have any interest in more restrictive regulation of pain medication. On the contrary, the AMA appears on record as being committed to improving patient access to palliative care. 65 In this respect, Justice Breyer also spoke for the majority of the Court when he indicated that restrictive laws, as opposed to institutional failures in medicine, would lead to a different result in any subsequent constitutional litigation over such matters. 66 Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion that legislatures have wide latitude to define suicide, legislative drafters who wish to provide physicians with legal immunity 67 for some assisted deaths face a new issue-criminal prosecution under federal narcotics laws. assisted suicide under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act constitutes a non-medical use under federallaw. 68 The DEA's position could lead to another round of litigation if a pharmacist or physician were prosecuted under federal narcotics laws. 69 Although litigants might frame the issue as whether the federal drug law's definition of medical purpose "preempts" Oregon's definition of medical purpose, such a prosecution could test the parameters of the constitutional right to palliative care.7° Under Rehnquist's constitutional analysis, a state legislature has the institutional competence to define suicide, and thus, to determine whether a medical practice at the end of life is legitimate. On thy other hand, Congress has asserted that federal funds should not be used to support the practice of physician-assisted suicide. 71 The actual implementation of any assisted suicide statute in the states faces two possible obstacles. First, whether the federal government's interest in controlling the distribution of drugs-requiring every physician and pharmacist in this country who administers narcotics to have a certificate from the federal government-can override any particular state's political decision to have physician-assisted death. Second, whether the one state where voters, not the legislature, have authorized the practice of physician-assisted death can devise a scheme to pay for the death-hastening drugs without the use of federal Medicaid or Medicare funds.
Given that it was the first state to attempt to "ration" its Medicaid expenditures, Oregon· may have enough voter interest in the cost pressures of health care to tackle this problem. Embedded in these questions is the larger institutional issue of Congress's role in medicine. 72 Proponents of assisted suicide in the vast majority of states, however, have an uphill battle. The Court's decision was, in some sense, made with full knowledge of the views of the various interest groups that are likely to participate in any political debates of physicians' roles in our deaths. 73 The Court's "no rights" finding, therefore, has probably swayed the moral debate against mobilizing the kind of political forces necessary to overcome the inertia of doing nothing. In addition, proponents face a national coalition, as indicated by the recent federal administrative rulings and federal statutes, that will oppose the open legalization of physician-assisted death.
III. WHEN THE VOTERS SAY "YES" TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Now that voters in Oregon have again approved a bill authorizing a form of physician-assisted death, 74 Oregon may become the first legal "laboratory" for determining whether the hopes of its proponents or the fears of its opponents will become reality. Proponents might look at the 60 percent majority 75 favoring the retention of the recently-passed initiative in Oregon as evidence that many other states will follow the "Oregon Trail." Opponents have already announced their intention to file a lawsuit to block implementation of the 1994 Oregon Death with Dignity Act. 76 If, however, we take seriously Chief Justice Rehnquist's invitation in Glucksberg to have a true debate about the role of physicians in our dying, 77 we must be cautious about relying upon the Oregon experience as representative of the entire country.
First and foremost, even though the Oregon voters said "yes" to physician-assisted death in 1994, voters in other western states have recently said "no." In 1991, the voters of Washington rejected a measure that would have "de-criminalized" several forms of physician assistance in patient deaths. 78 Every interest group imaginable, from the Hemlock Society to religious groups, paid for advertisements to convince voters to adopt or defeat the proposed amendment to Washington's Natural Death Act. 79 In the end, this media-embedded political process produced a 54 percent majority opposed to the proposed legislation. 80 Second, Oregon's process for enacting legislation is a form of "direct democracy" limited to a few, mostly western states. Although the initiative process has the same end result-an enacted statute-as the legislative process, the latter is a different kind of institutional process. Some of the constraints on the legislative process-such as passage by two differently-constituted representative chambers and the risk of gubernatorial veto in all states ("veto gates" 81 )-are not present in direct democracy schemes. 82 The role of interest groups further constrains the outcome of the legislative process because, on any given issue, many voters or non-voters are indifferent. 83 Despite the media attention paid to the issue of physician-assisted death, it is not clear that most people would necessarily place resolution of this ethical debate at the top of their list of political priorities. As a result, when the issue is broached by legislators, the power of various interest groups to block the enactment of legislation authorizing physician-assisted death is probably greater than the polls indicate. Blocking legislation only requires the institutional capacity to capture one of the "veto gates," be it the failure to move a bill out of committee or a governor's veto. As long as the AMA represents. institutionalized medicine's political interests, its opposition to granting physicians the statutory right to assist patient deaths virtually assures that such a bill will not pass in two separate legislative chambers. 84 
